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Abstract: In this paper, I develop an alternative account of the novel’s cognitive
value, based on the distinction Hannah Arendt made between truth (the result of
the ‘need to know’) and meaning (the result of the ‘need to think’), claiming that
the latter is better able to explain the novel’s cognitive value. To do this, I focus on
a twofold movement I consider central to our experience of literary works, namely
the fact that literary works always invite us to come to an interpretation of the
work, but at the same time resist interpretation.
In her posthumously published work Thinking, Hannah Arendt addresses the
fundamental question of what exactly thinking is. One of the most important
claims regarding thinking that Arendt makes, is that the activity of thinking
is a radically different act from the act of acquiring knowledge. Thinking,
Hannah Arendt claims, is the result of the human need to give meaning and
the act of thinking must therefore be understood as an ongoing process with-
out established results. Arendt’s analysis, however, not only involves making
a clear distinction between the act of thinking and scientific activities that
centre on the acquisition of knowledge, but also involves a claim regarding
the importance of art and literature. Arendt, for instance, refers to art as
‘thought-things’ (p. 184) or states that Heidegger was right when he called
poetry and thinking close neighbours (p.108).1 In this way, Arendt suggests
that we must understand literature, and art in general, as related to the act
of thinking.
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This makes it interesting to compare Arendt’s ideas on thinking and lit-
erature with the contemporary debate on the cognitive value of literature.2
Indeed, the cognitive value of literature is generally conceived as the idea
that readers discover new truths or acquire new knowledge by reading works
of literary fiction.3 This is, for instance, very clear when philosophers defend
a propositional theory of literary truth. Such theorists claim that readers
acquire new knowledge by reading fiction because literary works, explicitly or
implicitly, contain true propositions about the real world. But also when the
cognitive value of literature is described as an ethical value, this is generally
done in terms of the acquisition of ethical knowledge. Dorothy Walsh, for
instance, argues that literary works offer us a distinctive kind of knowledge,
namely knowledge about what it is like to.4 In a similar way, the cognitive
value of literature has also been described in terms of the acquisition or en-
richment of conceptual knowledge, as was done by, for instance, Catherine
Wilson.5
Building on Hannah Arendt’s distinction between acquiring knowledge
and thinking, we might, however, want to make a distinction between two
different kinds of cognition: cognition in the sense of the acquisition of knowl-
edge, on one hand and on the other, cognition in the sense of the mental pro-
cesses of understanding and of making sense of the world we live in. While
most theories on the cognitive value of literature seem to focus on the pos-
sibility that literary works contribute to the first kind of cognition, using
Arendt’s distinction might help us to show that it is rather the second kind
of cognition literary works contribute to, as I aim to show in this paper.
In this paper, I therefore want to explore to what extent Hannah Arendt’s
account of thinking can contribute to an investigation of the novel’s cogni-
tive value. Although Arendt writes in Thinking that literary works must be
considered as being related to the act of thinking, this idea is not really devel-
oped in her work. However, I think this idea enables us to come to a better
general understanding of the workings and importance of works of literary
fiction than many contemporary theories on the novel’s cognitive value can
offer, because their scope is often limited to particular literary genres, such
as realism.6
To do so, I will first highlight the relevant aspects of Arendt’s analysis
of thinking and explain the difference between the act of thinking and the
quest for knowledge. Subsequently, I will investigate how Arendt’s analysis
of thinking can help us to come to an understanding of the cognitive value of
literature. In this investigation, I will focus on one important characteristic of
literary fiction, namely the fact that it is situated in what can be considered
a ‘neutral space’. Whereas theories defending literary cognitivism often focus
on the connection and continuity between the fictional and the real world,
it is my claim that focusing on the discontinuity and on the way in which
the literary work of fiction suspends direct reference to the real world offers
a better starting point for a general theory on the cognitive value of literary
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fiction. As I will show, it is precisely because direct reference to reality is
suspended that the question arises as to what the literary work means. To
illustrate this, I will use William Shakespeare’s playOthello as an example and
highlight some of the many questions that arise when reading (or watching)
and interpreting this work. In this way, I will show how a text such as
Othello invites us to give meaning to, and to make sense of, what we read,
while no final meaning can be given. Moreover, I will show that this process
of interpretation also affects the readers’ frame of reference and their way of
understanding the world. I will thus argue that the cognitive value of literary
fiction must be understood as the invitation to think and ask questions, rather
than as the offering of truth or knowledge, as the cognitive value of literature
is generally understood.
I. HANNAH ARENDT’S CONCEPTION OF THINKING
As I already pointed out in the introduction, Hannah Arendt emphasises the
fact that there exists an important distinction between truth and meaning,
a distinction that is related to the fact that they result from two different
human needs. Truth, Arendt states, is the result of the human need to know,
while meaning results from the human need to think. This need to think
arises from the fact that experience or perception alone is unable to offer us
meaning or unity. Thinking, therefore, is asking what the existence of some-
thing means: through thinking we give meaning to what we experience or
perceive. While our need to know can be satisfied by getting an answer to
our questions, thinking essentially deals with unanswerable questions such as
what the meaning of life is, what the morally right thing to do is or what a
just society is. Questions such as these have emerged again and again in the
history of human thought and the answers given always remain unsatisfactory.
Although we know that we will never be able to define once and for all what,
for instance, a just society is, we often find ourselves discussing and thinking
about such ideas. Thinking therefore is necessarily self-destructive: every
answer is always temporal, every answer can again be called into question.
Thinking thus challenges us to question fixed ideas and in this way unfreezes
frozen thought. According to Arendt, thinking therefore ‘inevitably has a de-
structive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements
for good and evil, in short on these customs and rules of conduct we treat of in
morals and ethics’.7 Therefore, Socrates is for Arendt the perfect example of
a thinker. Rather than offering his interlocutors truth or knowledge, Socrates
invites them to think and to critically examine their opinions. Socrates never
comes to a fixed answer and his discussions therefore end undecided.
However, apart from the fact that the value of thinking consists of offering
us questions and doubts, thinking, as we have seen, also creates something,
namely meaning. In this way, thinking contributes to the constitution of what
we can call, in phenomenological terms, our horizon, the larger context of
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meaning in which any particular meaningful presentation is situated and thus
the frame of reference that determines the way we ‘see’ the world. Though
this horizon is to a certain extent stable, it is neither static nor unchanging. In
the process of thinking, new meanings arise and other, previously established
meanings are questioned and superseded.
One very basic example to make this clear can be found in the fact that
we generally conceive the actions of other people as meaningful in some way.
We do not see other people act randomly, we consider their actions to be
the result of certain intentions. By ascribing such intentions to actions, we
consider these actions to have a certain meaning. When you, for instance,
have to wait for a long time for someone you are supposed to meet, it is
possible that you assume that the fact that this person keeps you waiting
means that he or she shows you little respect. However, it is possible that
there might be another reason why this person keeps you waiting and that
you, when you consider this possibility, come to ascribe a different meaning
to this behaviour. However trivial this example may seem, it does of course
show us how the meaning we ascribe to things and actions determines the
way we see the world and act in it and how these meanings can be questioned
and replaced by other meaningful ways to look at things. This is obviously
also the case with less trivial issues, such as our ideas on justice, which are
based on all sorts of assumptions, all sorts of meaningful ways in which we
look at things. When some of these assumptions are questioned, when we
discover new meaningful ways to look at certain things, it is of course likely
that our ideas on justice will change as well.
II. LITERARY FICTION AND THE NEUTRAL SPACE
When we want to understand how the workings of literary fiction are related
to thinking, as described by Arendt, we need to take a closer look at one
important characteristic of works of literary fiction, namely the fact that
these works are situated in what we might call a ‘neutral space’. By using
this term, I refer to the fact that works of literary fiction suspend the reference
to the real world.8 When reading a work of fiction, we know that the sentences
we read do not describe states of affairs in the real world. When we read (or
watch), for instance, Shakespeare’s Othello, we know that Othello and Iago
do not exist and that the play is not to be understood as a report of true
facts. We know that the sentences we read are not meant as claims about
the real world.9 The statements we read are thus ‘neutralised’ by the fictional
nature of the work. What we read is, indeed, fictional. Therefore, as Derrek
Attridge has highlighted in his critical reading of the works of J.M. Coetzee,
fiction ‘is always involved in a certain avoidance of responsibility.’10 Although
it might be possible to read certain utterances in a literary work of fiction
as utterances about the real world, we are not supposed to read them this
way. Such statements are ‘neutralised’ by the fact that they appear in a
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work of fiction: writers need not account for the statements they make in
a work of fiction, and if somebody were tempted to make a writer account
for them, the writer could always avoid doing so by referring to the fictional
nature of these statements. It is important to stress this point because in
the history of literature writers of course have often been held accountable
for what they have written. However, it should be obvious that when, for
instance, a character in a novel makes a racist remark, this does not mean
that the author shares this character’s view. This statement in the novel
should not normally be read as a claim the author makes about the real
world, but should rather be understood by referring to the context in which
it appears. The reader thus has to ask what the function of such a statement
in the context of the work is, which might be, for instance, showing the moral
reprehensibility of the fictional character who utters it.
An interesting example to help explain what I mean, is J.M. Coetzee’s
lecture The Lives of Animals.11 Coetzee’s text, which was presented as the
1997-98 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, is peculiar in multiple ways.
First of all, the lecture is anything but a traditional one, but rather consists
of a fictional story. Furthermore, the fictional narrative itself tells the story
of Elisabeth Costello, a famous writer who gives a lecture at a prestigious
university in the United States. In this lecture, Costello focuses on the ques-
tion of animal rights and argues that reason and philosophy have done little
good to this question and that poetry is better able to foster our moral sense
towards animals. Coetzee in a way intensifies Costello’s statement by writing
a fictional story instead of a traditional lecture, as if illustrating that the topic
of his lecture can better be presented in a literary way than in a philosophical
way.
Coetzee’s choice is in this way both a thought-provoking one and, consid-
ering the fact that the text was presented as a lecture, a highly problematic
one. Coetzee’s choice indeed implies the possibility of arguing in favour of cer-
tain statements concerning animal rights without being held accountable for
these statements. In his response to Coetzee’s ‘lecture’, Peter Singer clearly
struggles with this, resulting in a response that consists of a fictional story in
which a fictionalised Singer debates Coetzee’s lecture with his daughter and
expresses his difficulties concerning writing a response:
But are they Coetzee’s arguments? That’s just the point – that’s
why I don’t know how to go about responding to this so-called
lecture. They are Costello’s arguments. Coetzee’s fictional de-
vice enables him to distance himself from them. And he has this
character, Norma, Costello’s daughter-in-law, who makes all the
obvious objections to what Costello is saying. It’s a marvellous
device, really. Costello can blithely criticise the use of reason, or
the need to have any clear principles or proscriptions, without Co-
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etzee really committing himself to these claims. Maybe he really
shares Norma’s very proper doubts about them.12
As Singer’s response makes clear, the problematic aspect of Coetzee’s lec-
ture, as a lecture, consists in its use of a fictional device and the neutralisation
that comes with it. In this way, Coetzee’s lecture clearly shows us something
important about the workings of fiction and its ambivalent relation to speak-
ing the truth. It is precisely the suspension of reference that causes this
ambivalence.
Because of this suspension of reference, the question of what a particular
work of literary fiction means arises. Because its meaning cannot be found
in its direct reference to the real world and because the readers read a text
in which certain artistic choices have been made, and which is composed in a
certain way, a work of literary fiction invites its readers, as I will show later
on in this text, to ask an infinite series of questions and to make sense of what
they read. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, for instance, confronts us with
different opinions considering animal rights without showing a clear preference
for one of these positions, as one generally does in a philosophical text or a
traditional lecture. The reader is thus invited to try to figure out what the
meaning of this work is, what the possible intentions of the author were. By
using the term ‘possible intentions’ I hope to make clear that unravelling
what the meaning of a work is does not mean that one has to go looking for
the actual intentions of the author, as extreme intentionalism claims. What
I mean is that we have to see a literary work as the result of an intentional
process; the words and sentences we read are not randomly generated by a
computer. It is the idea that a work has an author that invites the reader
to look for the work’s meaning and thus to look for what a literary work can
and possibly aims to tell us indirectly about the real world.
III. THE POVERTY OF FICTION
Furthermore, the question of what a literary work means arises all the more
because descriptions of the characters, of their history, of the events in the
story, are to a certain extent always limited. Compared to knowledge about
events that took place or people that exist(ed) in the real world, of which we
can say that it is potentially possible to acquire more knowledge, for instance
by talking to new witnesses or by consulting other sources, acquiring such
knowledge about fictional events or people outside of the given literary work
is normally not possible. In one of his essays, Maurice Blanchot describes
this ‘poverty’13 as the essence of fiction: because the fictional world that is
presented is only accessible by reading, my knowledge about this world is
always restricted to what I can read. However, by taking together different
descriptions in a novel and by using external knowledge, readers often make
assumptions about the characters or the events that help them to come to
a better understanding of the novel. When we, for instance, read a novel
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that is set in World War II, we will normally use our knowledge about this
period to come to an understanding of the described events, even when this
background information is not explicitly mentioned in the novel. The fact
that we generally use our knowledge about the real world when coming to
an understanding of the fictional world we encounter may seem to be in
contradiction to the idea that fiction suspends the reference to the real world,
but this is not the case. Whereas we can use our knowledge about the real
world when making sense of a fictional one, this does not mean that the
sentences we read in a fictional work are sentences that are meant as claims
about the real world. Furthermore, readers always have to be aware of the
fact that, although the fictional world they encounter seems similar to the
real world, there will always be differences between the two, for instance
because there are people in the fictional world that do or did not exist in
the real world, which means that the assumptions readers make using their
knowledge about the real world might be not correct. But because these
assumptions, however well-argued they might be, remain assumptions and
transcend the accessible knowledge we have about the fictional world, different
well-argued assumptions and interpretations are possible and a final answer
to the questions that arise when reading remains out of reach.
It is precisely this fact that literary works of fiction raise an infinite se-
ries of questions and always leave us unsatisfied with the previously given
answers that makes them great works of art. The fact that the already given
interpretations of a work are not able to give us completely satisfying answers
to the questions the work raises results from the fact that an interpretation
is meant to shed some light on a work. Shedding such light however always
means highlighting some aspects of a work and therefore paying less atten-
tion to, or neglecting, others. No interpretation is able to offer us a complete
understanding of a literary work of art. Literary works of art invite us to give
answers to the questions they raise, although no ‘true’ answer can be given.
Because of this impossibility to give a definitive answer, a literary work of
fiction keeps inviting us to interpretation and ‘haunts’ the reader.14
As might be clear, this description of the invitation of the literary work
to come to an interpretation by raising a series of questions although no true
answer or interpretation exists is very similar to the description of thinking
given by Hannah Arendt. As Arendt describes it, thinking is the activity
directed to the creation of meaning, although no meaning is ever final and
every meaning that results from thinking can always be questioned again and
rethought. When interpreting a literary work and trying to grasp what a work
might mean, this creation of meaning, however, is twofold. First of all, we try
to comprehend what the work means by looking at its internal consistency.
For instance, we formulate a theme which makes it possible to understand
the work’s inner logic. In this way, we come to see how the different aspects
and events in the work contribute to the work as a whole. However, when
doing so, our interpretation of the novel also contributes to the processes of
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giving meaning in the real world. When, for instance, we try to decipher
what Kafka’s short story Before the Law means, we can, as Jacques Derrida
did,15 shed some light on this work by understanding this story about a man
who faces the inaccessibility of the law as a story about the inaccessibility
of the story itself. In this way, we come to an understanding of the different
elements of the story and of the story’s meaning. But at the same time, such
an interpretation also adds something to our understanding of the nature of
fiction and offers us a new, meaningful way to understand our relation to
fictional stories.16
IV. MAKING SENSE OF KILLING DESDEMONA
To develop this idea further, I will use William Shakespeare’s play Othello,
The Moor of Venice as an example. In this play, as is well known, Othello,
a Moorish general in the Venetian army, is deceived by his unfaithful ensign,
Iago, into believing that his wife, the beautiful Desdemona, has been unfaith-
ful, resulting in Othello killing Desdemona. At the basic level, Shakespeare’s
Othello therefore seems to tell us something about love and jealousy. But
what exactly? Does the story mean that love can easily be destroyed by the
poison of jealousy? This already raises the question of whether jealousy is
really the motivation of Othello’s act. Othello himself, for instance, seems to
suggest that he acts out of a sense of duty and honour. He speaks of prevent-
ing Desdemona from betraying more men and of his murder as a ‘sacrifice’
and himself as an ‘honourable murderer’ (Act V, Scene II). Seen from this
point of view, Desdemona seems to be the victim of a more general cultural
context with a particular view of women and of how women should behave,
rather than the victim of a purely personal tragedy.
However, when taking all this into account when interpreting Othello, we
have not yet said anything about one important characteristic of Othello,
namely the fact that he is a Moor. Does Othello have a racist overtone? Not
only do other characters often make racist remarks about Othello, Othello’s
blackness can also be a metaphor for his horrible deed. While Othello is
described in the first act of the play as ‘far more fair than black’ (Act I,
Scene III), he is described as a ‘black devil’ (Act V, Scene II) at the end of
the play, as if, by his act, Othello became what he was always meant to be. Is
Othello, then, to be perceived as a less civilised, animal creature, who follows
his instincts? But how can we relate that to the importance Othello gives to
the notions of duty and honour? Does the play tell us that civilisation is but
an illusion that merely covers up our natural instincts? Or does Othello’s
blackness function in a different way as a motivation for his actions, namely
by being the cause of self-hate and a feeling of inferiority which makes him
believe too easily that his wife would prefer another (white) man?
Furthermore, another important characteristic of Othello has not yet been
taken into account, namely the fact that he is a military man and that his
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actions take place against the background of a war. Is not the reason why
Othello too easily trusts Iago to be found in the fact that he, as a military
man, is trained to trust his fellow soldiers? Is not the way he deals with his
problem, by killing Desdemona, a solution that stems from the fact that he
is solely used to dealing with military matters? And is not Othello just as
much a victim of a military-like strategy, namely Iago’s? Furthermore, many
parallels can be drawn between the personal relations between the different
characters and the state of war they are in. Is love then to be understood as
a war-like affair or does love become dangerous when regarded as such?
In a similar way, the actions and motivations of the other characters in the
play give rise to many other questions. What about, for instance, Iago? What
is the true reason for his hatred of Othello? Is it the fact that Othello passed
him over for a promotion or rather that he suspects Othello has slept with his
wife? Furthermore, why does Iago drag so many other innocent characters
into his revenge? Are they just collateral damage or is there something else
involved?
V. THE CREATION OF MEANING AND THE COGNITIVE
VALUE OF LITERATURE
These are just some of the many questions that arise when we engage seriously
with a work such as Othello. Many more questions can be brought forward
and it is clear that they can never receive any definitive answer. It is always
possible to look at the story and how the story is presented from a new
perspective and this new perspective might show the lacunae in previous
interpretations. Nevertheless, we, as readers, assume that the work we read
has a certain meaning, just because this work is ‘authored’, which means that
the readers presuppose that the words they are reading ‘are the product of a
mental event or a number of such events whereby the processes of linguistic
meaning are engaged’.17
This, of course, does not mean that the reader must try to discover the
‘true’ intentions of the author, but rather that the reader must assume that
the work he or she reads is the result of certain artistic choices and intentions.
For instance, we hardly know anything about who William Shakespeare was,
but we read his works supposing that he had certain aims when he wrote his
works, that he was in a certain way communicating something. However, as I
argued previously, the neutralisation that is characteristic of works of fiction
makes different well-argued assumptions about, and interpretations of, the
work possible. So although we presuppose that the work we read was written
with a certain intention, it is impossible to discover the work’s ‘true’ meaning.
A work such as Othello thus invites us to discover the possible meanings
it contains. To do so, we ask ourselves what the story means by focusing on
the many different aspects of the story. We ask ourselves why it matters that
Othello is a Moor, why it matters that he is a military man, why it matters
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that the story is set on an island against the background of a war, and so on.
When trying to answer such questions and to discover the meaning of these
aspects of the story for the story, we of course use our general knowledge
about the world and our own experiences to come to answers. It is, for
instance, only possible to engage in a reading of Othello where attention is
given to the particular position of women in the cultural context in which
the play is set, when we are already aware of the fact that the position of
women in Shakespeare’s time is very different from the position of women in a
contemporary western society, although our society must to a certain extent
also be seen as the heir of certain historically grown gender stereotypes which
have still not been completely overcome. The specific position of women
within the cultural context in which Othello is set is perhaps most clear in the
text when Iago’s wife Emilia testifies against her husband after Desdemona
has been killed (Act V, Scene II). Emilia wants to testify, although it is proper
that she obeys her husband who commands her to go home, which results in
Iago killing his wife for disobeying him and telling the truth. Furthermore,
the first act of the play, in which Desdemona speaks of her duties to her father
and husband, also makes it clear that women are in a sense regarded as the
‘property’ of men and are expected to obey the man that is their guardian.
We can only understand these ways of speaking and the ways the characters
relate to one another when we already understand that this results from a
broader cultural view of women. At the same time, engaging with the way
in which women are portrayed in Shakespeare’s Othello and with the way
in which this portrayal plays a role in the development of the story, also
influences and enhances our previous understanding. This is, however, not to
be understood as the acquisition of knowledge or the discovery of truth: it is
not the case that Shakespeare offers us a ‘better’ conception of gender roles or
that we have learned something new about the position of women in Europe
in the 17th century. Rather, reading Othello offers us food for thought: it
offers us, for instance, a new, meaningful way to reflect upon the position of
women in society.
In this way, it becomes clear why it is important to stress the fact that
literary works invite us to ask an infinite series of questions. Our engagement
with questions such as the importance of the position of women within the
development of the story of Othello can never lead to a final answer, but
rather gives rise to many more questions. These questions are, in the first
place, meant to shed light on the work and to understand the work as a whole.
We ask ourselves, for instance, how the portrayal of women contributes to the
development of the story and what difference another image of women would
make to this story. However, when asking these questions, the fictional story
in return offers us a meaningful way to reflect upon our own frame of refer-
ence. The events presented in the story might show us that our conceptual
framework falls short when trying to account for them. They might offer us
a more concrete embodiment of the abstract ideas we use or offer us a new
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perspective to reflect upon previous assumptions. In this way, it becomes
clear that reading and interpreting literary works can be seen as a form of
thinking, as described by Hannah Arendt. In the process of interpretation, we
discover new, meaningful ways to encounter the world we live in and enlarge
our frame of reference. We are enabled to question our previous assumptions
and are offered new perspectives to look at the already familiar.
CONCLUSION
When engaging with literary works in a serious way by becoming involved
with the questions they raise, it becomes clear that the cognitive value of
literature should be understood as related to the way in which the literary
work evokes meaning and offers food for thought by raising questions and
doubts. As I have shown, this ability to raise questions is strongly related
to the fact that works of literary fiction are situated in a ‘neutral space’ and
that our knowledge about the fictional world is always restricted to what
we can read. It is because our knowledge is limited and because we, as
readers, assume that the work we read has a meaning, that it was written by
an author with certain intentions, that the work raises many questions that
invite reflection, even though these questions remain unanswerable.
Furthermore, when reflecting upon these questions we use our general
knowledge about the world and our own experiences to come to answers,
which also results in a transformation of our frame of reference. A work such
as Othello can offer us meaningful ways to reflect upon not only the position
of women in society, but also on, for instance, post-traumatic stress disorder
in soldiers, the relation between racism and self-hate or conceptions of duty
and honour. Therefore, reading and interpreting a work such as Othello
can enrich our understanding, without offering us an alternative conception
or new knowledge. Reading works of literary fiction offers us instead, in
line with Hannah Arendt’s description of thinking, a way to unfreeze frozen
thought. Precisely because works of literary fiction do not make unambiguous
statements or direct statements about the real world, they offer an invitation
to reflection.
In this way, it is clear that literature, as literary theorist Derek Attridge
has formulated, ‘solves no problems and saves no souls, . . . (but that it is)
effective, even if its effects are not predictable enough to serve a political or
moral program’.18 The dangers that are inherent in literature are therefore
related to its cognitive value and the activity of thinking as such. As Arendt
admitted, the danger of thinking resides in the fact that the questioning of all
accepted doctrines and rules can also end up in the production of a reversal
of the old values, and the declaration of these as ‘new values’. Therefore,
nihilism is a danger inherent to the activity of thinking itself, but this danger
arises ‘out of the desire to find results which would make further thinking
unnecessary’.19 In a similar way, it is possible that readers stick to one inter-
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pretation and are unable to be open to new or other interpretations. This is
an unpredictable risk, arising from the literary work’s fundamental openness
and the reader’s desire to make further thinking unnecessary. Although the
literary work invites the reader to think, it remains up to the reader to accept
this invitation. The only thing the literary work can do, is to make an appeal
to the reader. An important part of literary education and of becoming famil-
iar with literary practice should therefore consist of learning how to respond
to this appeal. Only in this way can the literary work of art be appreciated
appropriately and its cognitive value recognised.
leen.verheyen@uantwerpen.be
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lessly and relatively automatically under-
stands both what one is supposed to imag-
ine and what one is supposed to believe’
(Stock 2016, 82). However, as I argue in
this text, such a view strongly underesti-
mates the fact that the reference to the
real world of such sentences is neutralised
because they are embedded in a work of
fiction and because of the avoidance of re-
sponsibility that is related to this neutral-
isation.
10. Attridge 2004a, 149.
11. Coetzee 1999.
12. Singer 1999, 91.
13. Blanchot 1995, 75.
14. For a further elaboration of this idea, see
Verheyen 2018.
15. Derrida 1992, 181-220.
16. For a more detailed exploration of this ex-
ample, see Verheyen 2018.
17. Attridge 2004b, 101. Derrek Attridge de-
scribes the notion of ‘authoredness’ by
stating that ‘to read a text in the fullest
sense – in contrast to mechanically decod-
ing it – is to treat it not as a static as-
semblage of words but as the “written,”
or even better – because it captures the
unending activity involved – as a writing.
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There are texts that demand only decod-
ing, texts that carry no implication of hav-
ing been written. (. . . ) But most of what
I read, I read as writing, which is to say as
words which have in some sense been cho-
sen and arranged. This choosing and ar-
ranging can, and of course very often does,
lack any particular creativity. Where it is,
or rather can in a creative reading be taken
to be, creative – in the sense I have given
the term – it seems appropriate to call
the written object a work, suggesting as
this word does the labor that went into its
creation. In this it corresponds well with
the double meaning of “invention.” By
contrast, “text” (as Roland Barthes liked
to remind his readers) suggests an unau-
thored weave of linguistic signs, and seems
more appropriate for the vast quantity of
uncreative writing.’ (Attridge 2004b, 103).
18. Attridge 2004b, 4.
19. Arendt 1971, 435.
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